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Issues of fairness in hierarchies have been mostly investigated { both theoretically
and experimentally { within dyadic principal{agent relationships. In this paper we
consider triangular principal{multiagents structures, integrating vertical hierarchical
relationships with horizontal agent{to{agent ones. We explore in the laboratory a
game that allows to investigate how principal's fairness aects cooperation between
two interdependent agents performing a simple production task. Our experimental
ndings show that perceived fairness of principal's actions may trigger reciprocation
in agents' behavior, aecting how agents play the production game.
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1 Introduction
Issues of equity and fairness in hierarchical organizations have been widely
recognized as a key problem since many years by human resource
practitioners (see Council [1991] for an review). In the last decade, they have
also gained the spotlight in empirical economic research, typically in the
frameworks of agency theory and contract design. Such developments have
been fostered mostly by experimental studies investigating, in laboratory
conditions, the behavioral consequences of alternative types of compensation
2schemes and the eectiveness of economic and non economic contract
enforcement devices on work eort levels.1
Much of the evidence gathered by experiments has shown that the behavior
of subjects in agency relationships is signicantly aected by relative and
distributive concerns. Agents seem to take into account the way principals
behave and perform systematic comparisons of payos. Agents' concerns for
principals' fairness result in agents' reciprocating behavior (costly
punishment of principals' unfair behavior and costly reward of principals' fair
behavior). In turn, principals' are often aected by fairness considerations,
oering \fair contracts".
The scope of these analyses is usually restricted to bilateral, \vertical"
relationships between a principal and an agent, reecting the dyadic
orientation of both organizational economics and theories of fairness.
However, most organizational contexts imply pyramidal, multi-agent
structures. In such contexts, \vertical" fairness considerations become often
inextricably intermingled with concerns for \horizontal" equity between
agents. Studies on team compensation and peer-to-peer working relationships
show that such considerations may be of crucial im portance in aecting job
performances (consider, for instance, the impact of relative evaluation or
group incentive schemes, or the eect of information about peers
compensation on job performance).
Fairness issues in heirarchies are thus at the crossroads of both horizontal
and vertical relations. Nevertheless, very little research has jointly addressed
1For a comprehensive survey of experimental research on these topics see, for instance,
[G achter and Fehr, 1999, Rossi, 1999].
3these two dimensions of interaction. Not only is empirical research on
\triangular" principal{agent relationships substantially absent, theory is
missing as well. To our knowledge, only a few theoretical studies
[Mookherjee, 1984, Itoh, 1994] have developed the principal{agent framework
in a multi{agent setting. Triangular features are similarly overlooked by
economic theories of reciprocity.2
This paper may be regarded as an exploratory attempt to blend the vertical
and horizontal agency relationships in a three{person game. In contrast with
previously existing three{person games (such as McCabe et al. [2000], Kagel
and Wolfe [1999], Camerer and Knez [1995]), here a hierarchical structure in
players role is introduced (one principal and two agent). We explore whether
and to what extent fairness in the principal's behavior aects cooperation
between two interdependent agents performing a stylized production task.
In order to make it easier to interpret the experimental results, we have kept
the experimental scheme as simple and familiar as possible. The experiment
consists in the iteration of a two{stage game. In the rst stage the principal
decides which share of the pie that will be generated by his agents he will
keep for himself and which share will correspondingly be distributed to the
agents, according to a piece rate scheme. In the second stage, agents generate
the pie by playing a production game in which the relative payos of the
agents have a Prisoner's Dilemma structure, but their absolute value is
determined by the piece rate unilaterally determined by the principal in the
rst stage.
Our results highlight that the principal fairness strongly aects agents'
2By the way, see a short discussion in the concluding section of Rabin [1993].
4behavior. Kind principals foster mutual cooperation between agents, while
greedy ones induce more joint defection.
The paper is organized as follows: next section summarizes the main
experimental evidence on fairness in agency relationships and contract
design. Section 3 introduces our experiment. Section 4 presents the main
experimental results. Some comments on the results and further
developments of our research are shortly discussed in Section 5.
2 Fairness and agency: previous studies
The \Gift Exchange Game" is the most extensively studied experimental
paradigm for vertical fairness ([Fehr et al., 1993, 1998b, Fehr and Falk,
forthcoming, Fehr et al., 1998a, Fehr and Tougareva, 1995]). It is a two{stage
game similar to a sequential social dilemma: the rst{stage is a wage
determination game in which workers (agents) and rms (principals) trade
for stipulating job contracts with each other (according to a particular labor
market structure); in the second{stage, workers who successfully concluded a
contract with a rm must choose an eort level. Theoretical predictions
suggest that workers should exhibit minimal eort levels, no matter which
wage they receive. Firms, anticipating this, should respond by paying the
competitive (zero rent) wage corresponding to the minimum eort level.
Experimental ndings, however, show that average wages are substantially
above the competitive wage corresponding to the agent's minimum eort,
and agent's eort levels are higher than the minimum. Moreover, workers's
wages contain substantial amounts of rent (wages are much higher than the
5competitive wage corresponding to the workers' observed eort levels). These
results seem to suggest that principals actually do take into account fairness
motives when oering a contract to agents, and that agents react to fair
wages showing working eorts higher than the minimum level. Further
studies have then investigated to what extent the reciprocal attitude of
principals and agents may be able to mitigate the contract enforcement
problem [Fehr and G achter, 1998, Fehr et al., 1997]. Behavioral evidence
conrms that reciprocal motives within the agency relationship may be
regarded as a successful device in raising eort levels above the Nash
equilibrium ones [Fehr and G achter, 1998], and that reciprocity alone may be
more eective than many traditional contract enforcement devices such as
incentive contracting, nes and monitoring [Fehr et al., 1997].
More standard agency settings have also been recently explored. Keser and
Willinger [2000] implemented in the laboratory a standard textbook
principal{agent game with hidden action. In this setting, theory predicts
that the principal should be able to have the agent accepting a contract that
gives all the rent to the principal and leave to the agent the eciency salary.
Experimental evidence, on the contrary, shows that principals' oers are, on
average, much more fair than the predicted ones, because principals seem to
anticipate that (as in the ultimatum game) unfair oers may be rejected by
agents.
Finally, Anderhub et al. [1999] investigate a principal{agent game with no
hidden action and deterministic prot function where the agent's contract
consists in a xed component (base pay) and a return share on rm's prots.
They show that agents tend to reject unfair contracts and that fair contracts
6are reciprocated (eorts level are higher than the optimal ones conditional to
the accepted contract).
3 A triangular Principal{Multiagent game
3.1 The model
Consider this simple production setting with one principal and two agents:
the two agents are involved in a simple production task where each of them
has to decide on the allocation of his working eort. More precisely, each
agent has to decide whether he is going to help (or collaborate with) the
other agent or not. The decision of one agent aects both his production level
and the one corresponding to the other agent: while helping eorts of one
agent increase the other's production level, on the other side they decrease
the agent's own production amount. Moreover, if both the agents decide to
provide help, they are both better o (with respect to their production levels)
but, regardless of what the other agent is going to do (providing help or not),
the production level for one agent is always higher when he is not providing
help because he can concentrate more eort on his own production task.
Produced units are placed in a market with excess demand by the rm
owner, the principal. Without loss of generality we can assume that each
produced unit is worth 1 experimental currency unit for the principal. He is
the residual claimant of the value of units produced by the two agents.
Agents' remuneration is governed by a simple piece rate rule, whose rate per
unit is identical for the two agents and is arbitrarily decided by the principal.
7Agents cannot decide to terminate the contract with the rm (this means
that no side market option is introduced in the model and the participation
of workers in the rm is not investigated here).
The described production task is modeled as a two{stage game, that runs as
follows: in the rst stage the principal publicly announces which share
1   (W=100) of the output value (that will be produced in the second stage
by the two agents) is to be attributed to himself as his own payo in the
round. Alternatively, one can interpret W=100 as the piece rate, the per unit
remuneration assigned to agents by the principal.3 The domain for W is any
integer number between 1 and 100. In the second stage, then, each agent has
to decide between two alternative strategies (H and L) that result in




Figure 1: The rm production function: relationship between agents'
decisions and agents' individual output levels.
This structure of output may be thought as the simplest way to model task
interdependency of two agents in a production setting: if they both choose to
help each other (strategy H) they are both better o, while restraining from
helping the other agent (strategy L) is the dominant strategy (for an agent
concerned in maximizing his own production level).
3Language in subjects' instructions was kept as neutral as possible and we explicitly
avoided terms as \piece rate" or \remuneration".
8Hence, the agents' relative payo structure in the game clearly recall a
prisoner's dilemma game where absolute payos depend on W as depicted in
Figure 2.
Payo(A1), Payo(A2) H L
H (W=100)60;(W=100)60 (W=100)10;(W=100)70
L (W=100)70;(W=100)10 (W=100)20;(W=100)20
Figure 2: Agents' payo conditional to piece rate W and agents' behavior.
Finally, the principal's payo, depending on the agents' strategies, is
determined as in Figure 3.
H L
H (1   W=100)  120 (1   W=100)  80
L (1   W=100)  80 (1   W=100)  40
Figure 3: Principal's Payo conditional to piece rate W and agents' behavior.
The game extensive form is reported in Figure 4. Using a standard backward
induction argument it is clear that, no matter what the principal decides in
the rst stage of the game, in the second stage the agents should restrain
themselves from helping the other, since they face a standard prisoner's
Figure 4: The game extensive form representation.
9dilemma game (whose payos are a linear transformation of the production
levels of Figure 1). Thus, a principal anticipating this, should decide to
retain for himself, the largest possible share of the pie. Hence, the unique
Nash equilibrium for the one shot game is for the principal to choose W = 1
and for the two agents to play strategy L.
3.2 The experimental design
The experimental design consists in a series of two experiments that were
played sequentially by a population of 54 college undergraduates recruited at
the University of Trento (Italy) during July 1999 (30 of them were
undergraduates in Economics). Subjects were recruited through
announcements on bulletin boards in the Faculty of Economics and were
asked to show up at the Computable and Experimental Economic
Laboratory. The announcements claimed that subjects would have been
engaged in an experiment lasting about 1 hour and would have been able to
gain up to a maximum of 50000 Italian liras (approximately equal to 25 US
dollars). During the experiment subjects earned experimental points that
were nally converted in Italian liras at the rate of 15 Italian liras per
experimental point and were paid to the subjects. In addition, all subjects
received a 10000 Italian liras (approximately equal to 5 US dollars) show up
fee. The exchange rate was known in advance by all subjects. Their average
nal payo was of about 34000 Italian liras (approximately equal to 17 US
dollars) for subjects in the role of principals and of about 16000 Italian liras
(approximately equal to 8 US dollars) for subjects in the role of agents,
10amounts which seemed more than sucient to motivate them during the
experiment.
The subjects were randomly divided in groups of 3 who remained
anonymously grouped during the entire experiment; the role of principal or
agent was also randomly assigned. Subsequently, subjects were seated in
front of computer terminals. After that an experimental administrator had
read the experiment instructions4 and answered aloud to any question,5 the
experiment begun. Interaction between subjects were reduced to the
minimum during the experiment: each subject could see some two other
participants in the room but not their terminal monitors and verbal
communication was not allowed at all. Since one group could nish the
experiment earlier than the others, participants were asked to remain quietly
seated at their desk and to ll a payment form needed for the payment of the
experiment.
Each of the two experiment consisted in the repetition of 15 identical rounds
of the game presented in Section 3.1. The number of repetitions were
considered a reasonable length of time to allow learning to take place (if any
was to occur). Each round was thus organized:
 First stage. The subject in the role of the principal is asked to type a
number between 1 and 100, corresponding to the value to assign to
variable W;
4A translation from Italian of instructions is given in Appendix A.
5Each subject was revealed his role in the experiment, the principal role or the agent role,
only after all questions were answered, so that, in asking questions to the administrator,
subjects could not signal to other participants their role.
11 Second stage. Each of the two subjects having the role of agent are
communicated the value of variable W and are asked to choose between
strategy H or L;
 End of round. Each of the three subjects is given full information on
decisions taken and payos earned by all the participants in the group.
At the end of the 15 rounds, subjects where told that they had to participate
to another experiment (experienced treatment), where groups were randomly
reshued while everyone kept the role held in the previous experiment
(novice treatment).
The total payo of each subject at the end of the experiment was then equal
to the sum of the payos earned by the subject during the 30 rounds, plus
the show up fee.
4 Experimental Results
Figure 5 plots overtime the average piece rate W chosen by principals and
the observed frequency of agents helping each other (henceforth
\cooperating") in each of the two treatments. Table 1 presents some
summary statistics on piece rates and on cooperation rates for each session.6
The equilibrium prediction is fullled in a relative low number of
observations (around 12% in the novice treatment and 20% in the
experienced treatment). The time series of piece rate do not show any
6In session 5, novice treatment, the data le was accidentally overwritten.
12Table 1: Descriptive Statistics per session
novice treatment experienced treatment
session groups subjects av. W coop. rate av. W coop. rate
1 4 12 23.5 0.492 24.5 0.458
2 4 12 20.5 0.375 17.6 0.225
3 4 12 36.7 0.533 35.8 0.308
4 3 9 23.6 0.555 23.4 0.322
5 3 9 -
6 -
6 30.8 0.411
ALL 18 56 26.3 0.484 26.3 0.343




















Figure 5: Average piece rate W and average cooperation rates for the novice
(upper plot) and the experienced (lower plot) treatments.
13signicant trend towards the equilibrium in both treatments. Both
treatments presents also the same average piece rate value (W = 26:3).
The cooperation rate exihibited by the agents (as shown in Figure 5) appears
to be slightly decreasing overtime in both novice and experienced treatments:
cooperation rates decline from 56:6% (rst period) to 43:3% (last period) in
the novice treatment and from 55:5% to 30:5% in the experienced treatment.
Statistical analysis although shows that in both cases the decrease is not
signicant (randomization test,  = 0:05).7 The average cooperation rates
are, respectively, about 48% in the novice treatment and about 34% in the
experienced treatment.
Behavior in both treatments somehow contrasts with the typical pattern of
declining cooperation rates that is observed overtime in most experiments on
iterated prisoner's dilemma [Andreoni and Miller, 1993], team production
Nalbantian and Schotter [1997] and public goods provision games Isaac et al.
[1985]).
As it is reasonable to expect, a close investigation of data reveals that the
experimental behavior of agents is heavily aected by the behavior of the
principal. In accordance with common sense, but contradicting equilibrium
predictions, the level of cooperation between agents responds to the kindness
of the principal. When the principal increases the piece rate, agents do not
decrease the joint production level in 84% (81%) of the observations in the
novice (experienced) treatment, and when the principal decreases the piece
rate, agents do not increase the joint production level in the 82% (91%) of
7Although In the experienced treatment this result may depend from the limited number
of independent observations.
14the observations in the novice (experienced) treatment.
This pattern of behavior may be viewed, in both novice and experienced
treatments, in Figure 6. When the principal tends to choose values of W
near the equilibrium, agents coordinate on (L,L) in the majority of
observations. As the principal selects higher values of W, more pairs of
agents tend to coordinate on (H,H) (in this case, all three subjects are better
o than in equilibrium). Thus, principal's fairness matters and aects the
mutual relationships of agents. For values of W lesser than 65-75, there is a
neat monotonic mapping from the piece rate W to the cooperation rate
achieved by the agents. Notice, however, that for high levels of W the
correlation between piece rate and output breaks down. This eect may be
not signicant since there are very few observations in the right tail of the
histograms plotted in Figure 6 (W > 70 only in 8% (4%) of the observations
in the novice (experienced) treatment). Moreover, as the history of individual
sequences of runs reveals, most \ultrafair" piece rates have been oered by
principals after a sequence of highly unfair moves { which might impair their
eectiveness.
The overall link between agents' performance and principals' fairness is
signicant for both the novice and expert populations of players: the
Spearman rank order correlation coecient is equal to rs = 21% for novices
and equal to rs = 36% for experts (both signicant at the  = 0:001 level).
The increased rank order correlation between the treatments is due to a large
extent to the increased frequency of (L,L) responses to low piece rates. Thus,
it seems that players have learned a strategy of coordinated reciprocation to
the principal unfair moves. This suggests that the impact of fairness






















Figure 6: Histogram plot of the frequency of productivity of agents correspond-
ing to dierent classes of piece rate W decided by the principal in the novice
(left side) and in the experienced treatment (right side). Top, middle and bot-
tom bars are respectively related to the frequency of observations where both
the agents cooperate, one agent only cooperates and the other one defects,
both agents defect.
considerations is not a temporary phenomenon, to be dissolved by a better
understanding of the game structure.
One may argue that the link between the level of piece rates W and
cooperation rates could nd an alternative explaination to the one suggested
here. More precisely, it could be argued that the behavior of agents may be
strongly aected by absolute size eects of the payo structure, rather that
by fairness considerations. In other words, it could be that increases in
cooperation rates may be just due to increases in the scale of the payo
structure, regardless on any perception of fairness. If this was the case,
substituting the principal with an automated random device governing the
piece rate W, should not change the observed agents' behavior.
A control treatment was then designed to test this competing explaination,
based on size eects. The control treatment consists in a two{person
16prisoner's dilemma game corresponding to the production subgame of the
basic treatment. Payos for the two agents of the control game are, once
again, the ones depicted in Fig. 2, but this time agents a computerized
device, rather than another experimental subject, chooses the value of W
sampling at random from the uniform distribution U  [1;100] (it is common
knowledge between the agents that values of W are randomly selected by an
articial device).8
The results of the control treatment are shown in Fig. 7. The comparison of
Fig. 7 with Fig. 6 clearly shows that, while the experimental outcomes of a
prisoner's dilemma game are not invariant to scale eects in the payo
structure, these eects of size on cooperation rates go in the opposite
directions to the ones exhibited in the baseline treatment. The control
treatment shows that, as the magnitude of the payos increases, more and
more agents defect, while cooperation is a more frequent outcome when
payos are smaller. Thus, in this treatment subjects seem to be very sensitive
to the absolute temptation to defect, despite the fact that the relative payo
8The experimental design closely followed the one described for the baseline treatment,
with the following dierences: 36 rst year undergraduate students (with no previous knowl-
edge of game theory) were recruited; subjects were divided in three cohorts of 12 partici-
pants and then randomly matched in pairs; no second experience treatment was run, since
we didn't want to test for the role of experience; experimental points were converted at the
rate of 40 Italian liras per point, and subjects earned on average 22000 Italian liras (approx-
imately equal to 11 US dollars) for an experiment lasting, on average, around 35 minutes.
Each round of the experiment run as follows: in the rst stage the computer program ex-
tracts the random value of W and sends it to the two agents, in the second stage each of
the two agents plays a prisoner's dilemma game with the payo depicted in Fig. 2.











Figure 7: Histogram plot of the frequency of cooperation of agents correspond-
ing to dierent classes of the random scale value W in the control treatment.
Top, middle and bottom bars are respectively related to the frequency of ob-
servations where both the agents cooperate, one agent only cooperates and the
other one defects, both agents defect.
structure of Fig. 2 is such that the additional gain from defection is relatively
small compared to the payo corresponding to mutual cooperation.
This result strongly corroborates the hypothesis that agents' perception of
principal's fairness, and not scale eects in the payo structure, accounts for
the pattern of cooperation displayed by agents in the baseline treatment.
Despite the tendency of agents to retaliate against unfair piece rates, the
data shows persisting high levels of unfairness in principals' behavior (see
Figure 8). If for example one takes as a benchmark usual laboratory behavior
in bargaining games [Roth, 1995], the behavior of principals in our
experiment seems unusually greedy. In about 50% of cases, principals take as
much as possible. Actually, our principals' behavior bears more resemblance
to that of players of a dictator game. In part, this may be explained by the
persistence of some miscoordination in agents' responses, that makes
18unfairness paying o on average. Given the observed distribution of agents'
responses, taking as much as possible is still the best move for principals even
in the experienced treatment (Figure 8). Although experienced agents
succeed in reducing the steepness of the principals' average payo curve, the
level of coordinated retaliation by agents is not enough to transform such
curve in a parable (even in the case of minimal piece rates, there is still a
30% of eveniences in which at least one agent plays H) . We also suspect
that, as the number of other players increases, considerations of unilateral
fairness (pure altruism) may dilute.
5 Discussion and further research
While the experiment shows that vertical and horizontal fairness interact in
hierarchical triangles, much needs to be done to better understand the nature
of such interactions.
More specically, understanding how principals' fairness aects relationships
between agents deserves some caution. Reciprocity has two faces, one
positive and the other negative [Rabin, 1993]: I may be willing to sacrice
my own material well{being to help the kind other or I may be willing to
sacrice my own material well{being to punish the unkind other. In dyadic
relationships, these two faces can be easily distinguished. This may not be
the case with triangular relationships. In particular, our experiment clearly
shows that fair principals tend to generate positive reciprocity between pairs
of agents { they act in each other's favor, as well as in favor of the principal,
and show higher and more persistent cooperation rates than in a conventional
















Figure 8: Relative frequencies of piece rate W and average payo for a principal
(downward data plot) and an agent (upward data plot) in the novice and in
the experienced treatment.
iterated prisoner's dilemma. On the other hand, interpreting how principals'
unfairness aects relationships between agents is much harder. Experimental
data suggest that unfair principals induce less cooperation between agents.
But whether this may be due to the fact that greedy principals generate
greedy agents, or, conversely, to the fact that agents unite their purposes in
retaliating the principal, still remains an unsolved research question. In other
words, does hierarchical unfairness induce unkindness or mutualism between
agents? Unfortunately, the structure of the game doesn't help much in
directly discriminating between these two hypotheses. Neither aggregate data
nor individual analysis of single play sequences give any incontrovertible
evidence. By deciding to produce L, an agent hurts the principal but at the
same time makes the other agent worse o. There is no way to infer an
agent's intention whitin this design and a more accurate experimental design
might be devised to separate those two eects.
Furthermore, we think that less symmetric situations are worth exploring.
For example, the principal might be able to dierentiate agents' rewards,
introducing asymmetries in incentives; asymmetries in agents' capabilities are
20case of interest as well. Also, the eects of information asymmetries deserve
further investigation: fairness considerations may be signicantly aected by
dierent distributions of information among players.
Finally, we claim that our experiment suggests more prudence in the use of
standard game{theoretic concepts in organization theory. While the use of
non{cooperative games as a tool for modeling organizational phenomena has
become widespread, little or no attention at all has been accorded to how
behavior in such games may change when they are embedded in a
hierarchical context. Our experiment shows that even when equilibrium
predictions do not change, the hierarchical context may deeply aect actual
agents' strategies. We think that much useful understanding might be gained




You are participating to an economic experiment. You are kindly asked to
carefully read the instructions. Then you will be able to ask questions that
will be openly answered. This experiment will last about one hour. If you
follow the instructions closely and make decisions carefully, you can earn a
considerable amount of money. During the experiment you can earn
experimental points that at the end of the experiment will be converted into
Italian liras (1 experimental point = 15 Italian liras) and will be added to the
xed amount of 10000 Italian lira. This will be your monetary payment for
participating in the experiment.
Instructions
During the whole experiment you are anonymously matched with other two
players in this room. One of the players is called player 1 (from now on, P1)
and the other two players are called player 2 and player 3 (P2 and P3).
Matching will be performed at random by the computer program at the
beginning of the experiment and will not revealed. Your identity during the
experiment (P1, P2 or P3) will be revealed after reading the instructions and
after that all questions will have been answered.
The experiment involves the repetition for 15 times (rounds) of two stages,
that will be described in a moment. At the end of each round, payos will be
announced and then the next round will start. Your nal payo will be equal
22to the sum of payos earned in each of the rounds, plus the xed payment of
10000 Italian lira.
Each round runs as follows:
First phase
Player P1 decides and sends to players P2 and P3 the value to be assigned to
W. W is a percentage number that can be chosen among all integer numbers
between 1(%) and 100(%).
Second phase
Players P2 and P3 decide, independently and simultaneously, whether to
undertake action A or action B.
End of round
The experimental software computes the quantities Q2 and Q3, produced by
players P2 e P3, on the basis of their choices during the second phase




A Q2 = 60;Q3 = 60 Q2 = 10;Q3 = 70
B Q2 = 70;Q3 = 10 Q2 = 20;Q3 = 20
Finally, the experimental software computes and sends to everyone the payo
earned by each player. Payos are computed according to the following
23formulas:
P1's Payo = (100   W)(Q2 + Q3);
P2's Payo = WQ2 ;
P3's Payo = WQ3 .
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